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Casenote

Pruning the Antitrust Tree: Credit Suisse
Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing and the
Immunization of the Securities Industry
from Antitrust Liability

I.

INTRODUCTION

In Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing,1 the United States
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Breyer, held that the current
securities law regime impliedly precludes the application of state and
federal antitrust laws to underwriters' and institutional investors'
conduct during initial public offerings of securities.2 Justice Stevens
concurred in the judgment only and issued his own opinion.3 Justice
Thomas delivered the lone dissent.4 Justice Kennedy did not participate
in the decision, likely because his son is a managing director of
petitioner Credit Suisse Securities.5 Overturning the United States

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
2007,

127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007).
Id. at 2387.
Id. at 2397-98 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 2398-2400 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Linda Greenhouse, Justices Back Underwriterson New Issues, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,
at C1, availableat 2007 WLNR 11461453.
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,6 the Court continued its legacy
of pruning the reach of potentially crippling class action antitrust suits
for treble damages in the hyper-regulated arena of public corporate
finance. The Court's decision makes clear that the securities laws
impliedly preclude antitrust laws when the two are "clearly incompatible," given the context and likely consequences. 7
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Public Offerings of Securities and the Role of Investment Banking
Firms
A public offering of securities immediately infuses capital into a
company, which may then use the investors' funds for any number of
purposes, including the development of new products, the expansion of
existing facilities, or the establishment of new markets.8 Companies
typically retain investment banking firms to assist with a public
offering, which is a highly technical process that can expose an issuing
company to crippling liability if improperly performed.' An important
way that investment banking firms assist companies wishing to issue
securities is by acting as underwriters. °
"Underwriting" generally refers to the process of helping a company
sell securities to the public by means of a registered offering.1 The
most common underwriting arrangement is known as "firm commitment"
underwriting, where the underwriter purchases securities directly from
the issuing company and then resells the securities to the public at a
profit.' 2 Firm commitment underwriters often form syndicates with
other investment banking firms to market the shares, thus hedging the
original underwriter's risk of being unable to dispose of an entire
issue.' 3
In preparation for a public offering, the syndicate investigates and
estimates the probable market demand for a company's securities at
various prices. 4 The syndicate makes a preliminary estimate of an

6. Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2397.
7. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES REGULATION 19 (6th
ed. 2006).

9. Id. at 22.
10. Id. at 24.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2388 (2007).

14. Id.
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offering's price and quantity, and the offering company submits the
estimate to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") in a
registration statement. 5 Afterwards, the syndicate conducts a "road
show," during which syndicate underwriters meet with potential
investors and gauge the strength of the investors' interest in the
company's securities.16 During this process, known in the industry as
"book building," underwriters learn which investors might buy securities
and in what quantities, at what prices, and for how long each is likely
to hold purchased securities before reselling them. 7 With this information, the underwriting syndicate will negotiate the final details of the
offering with the issuing company and will fix the price of the shares8
and the quantity for which the syndicate will be jointly responsible.'
On the date the registration becomes effective, the syndicate buys the
securities from the issuer at a discounted price and resells them to
investors at the agreed upon price.' 9 The underwriters' commission is
the difference between the purchase price from the issuer and the sales
price to the investors.2 °
B.

History of the Litigated Dispute

In January 2002 a group of sixty investors filed two class action
antitrust lawsuits against ten of the most prominent investment banking
firms in the world. 2 ' The complaints alleged that during the underwriting of some several hundred technology-related stocks from 1997 to
2000, the named firms formed syndicates and agreed not to allocate
shares to investors who would not pay "'additional anticompetitive charges'" above the public offering price.22
These additional anticompetitive charges took the form of conditions
that the underwriters forced potential investors to comply with in order
These conditions included (1) "laddering"
to purchase securities.
agreements, where the investors promised to place aftermarket bids for
additional securities at escalating prices above the initial offering price;
(2) "tying" agreements, where the investors committed to purchasing
other, usually less attractive, securities; and (3) the payment of excessive

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2388-89.
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commissions. In addition, the investors alleged that these practices
artificially inflated the share prices of the securities in question.23
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York dismissed the complaints on the ground that the federal securities
laws impliedly precluded application of antitrust laws to the conduct in
question.24 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed and reinstated the complaints.25 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide whether there was a "'plain repugnancy'" between the antitrust claims and the federal securities laws.26
III.
A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Introduction

Public corporate finance is an integral part of the American economic
system. Without the opportunity to raise capital through public
offerings, many companies would be unable to grow and develop. The
current securities law regime endows the SEC with extensive authority
to regulate all areas of the securities field. The Supreme Court has
three times before examined the interplay between the antitrust laws,
designed solely to foster competition, and the securities laws, which take
competition into consideration along with a number of other factors,
including the health of the economy and the public interest.
B.

The Three Precedents: Silver, Gordon, and NASD

The first case to examine the relation of securities law to antitrust law
was Silver v. NYSE.28 The Supreme Court in Silver considered a claim
by a broker-dealer that the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE" or
"Exchange") and its members had violated the antitrust prohibition
against group boycotts by collectively barring the broker-dealer from the
network of instant simultaneous communication used to communicate
timely offers to buy and sell securities in the over-the-counter market.2 9

23. Id. at 2389.
24. Id. (citing In re Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust Litig., 287 F. Supp. 2d 497, 524-25
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
25. Id. (citing Billing v. Credit Suisse First Boston Ltd., 426 F.3d 130, 172 (2nd Cir.

2005)).
26. Id. at 2387 (quoting Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S. 659, 682 (1975)).
27. See generally Gordon v. NYSE, 422 U.S, 659 (1975); United States v. Natl Ass'n of
Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975); Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
28. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
29. Id. at 342-43.
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The broker-dealer had obtained private telephone wire connections
between his companies and various other securities trading firms.3 °
The firms that were members of the NYSE applied to the NYSE for
approval of the connections, and the Exchange granted "'temporary
approval.'" 31 Later, without notice, explanation, or any opportunity for
a hearing, the Exchange instructed its member firms to disconnect the
direct wire connections, and the member firms complied. Despite every
effort on the part of the injured broker-dealer to exact an explanation
from the Exchange for its action, he received none. After the wires were
disconnected, the broker-dealer alleged, his volume of business and
profits dropped substantially. The broker-dealer sued under the
antitrust laws, seeking, inter alia, an injunction and treble damages.
The district court granted summary judgment and a permanent
injunction to the broker-dealer. 32 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed, however, holding that the Exchange was exempt from
the antitrust laws because it was exercising its power of self-regulation,
which it was required to exercise under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the "Exchange Act"). 3
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the majority noted that, as a
cardinal rule of construction, implied repeals are not favored.3 4 The
Court cautioned that, where possible, lower courts should attempt to
reconcile the operation of both statutory schemes rather than completely
ousting one. 5 Fashioning a guiding principle in the quest to reconcile
the two schemes, the Court explained that "[riepeal is to be regarded as
Act work, and
implied only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange
36
even then only to the minimum extent necessary."
The Court began its analysis in Silver by recognizing that if this
conduct had occurred in a context free from other federal regulation, it
would have constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act." Such
concerted agreements not to deal with other traders had long been
included in the forbidden category of injurious restraints on trade.38

30. Id. at 343.
31. Id. at 344.
32. Id. at 344-45.
33. Id. at 346 (citing Silver v. NYSE, 302 F.2d 714, 720 (2d Cir. 1962)); 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78nn (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
34. Silver, 373 U.S. at 357 (citing United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198
(1939)).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 347; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
38. Silver, 373 U.S. at 348 (quoting Kior's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.
207, 212 (1959)).
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Therefore, unless the conduct was justified by some other policy, the
Exchange had violated the Sherman Act.3" The Court held that the
Exchange Act did not justify the NYSE's anticompetitive collective action
taken without according fair procedure. °
In Silver the Exchange Act gave the SEC power to request that
registered exchanges, such as the NYSE, make changes to their rules."
However, the Exchange Act did not give the SEC jurisdiction to review
specific instances of enforcement of exchange rules.42 This absence of
SEC jurisdiction demonstrated that nothing in the securities regulation
regime performed the antitrust function of insuring that exchanges did
not apply their rules in a manner that injured competition and that was
not justified by some other regulatory end.43
In the absence of administrative oversight, the Court decided that
some form of review of exchange self-regulation by the courts was not
incompatible with the fulfillment of the aims of the Exchange Act."
The Court noted in dicta, however, that a "different case" would arise
concerning antitrust immunity were there SEC jurisdiction and ensuing
judicial review of a particular application of an exchange rule.45
The Court had an opportunity to decide this different case twelve
years later in Gordon v. NYSE. 46 In Gordon a class of small investors
sued the NYSE for fixing commission rates on small transactions, a
practice that allegedly violated the antitrust laws.4 7 In this case,
unlike in Silver, Congress had clearly given the SEC authority to
supervise exchange self-regulation with respect to the fixing of reasonable rates of commission.48 The SEC would determine what rates
would both protect investors and insure fair dealing.4 9 The SEC was
also authorized to require the adoption of such changes as were
necessary or appropriate.50
While Gordon had been percolating
through the court system, the SEC, by order, abolished fixed commission
rates, and Congress enacted legislation codifying this result but

39.

Id. at 348-49.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. at 357.
Id.
Id. at 358.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 358 n.12.
422 U.S. 659 (1975).
Id. at 660-61.
Id. at 681 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970) (amended 1975)).
Id. at 681.
Id. at 681-82.
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permitting the SEC discretion to impose fixed rates in the future if
warranted. 5
The Court began its analysis by restating the axiom of construction
that repeal of the antitrust laws would be implied only where there is' 52
a
"'plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions.'
Turning next to the issue raised in the case, the Court looked to Silver
as a starting point and reiterated that repeal would only be implied if
necessary to make the Exchange Act work, and then only to the
minimum extent necessary.5"
The Court, relying on three considerations, held that implied
immunity was necessary to make the Exchange Act work.5 The Court
noted that (1) the Exchange Act gave the SEC direct regulatory
authority over exchange rules and practices concerning the fixing of
reasonable rates of commission; (2) the SEC had actively reviewed
proposed rate changes during the previous fifteen years;55 and (3)
without antitrust immunity, courts would likely impose different
standards, which would put exchanges in the precarious position of not
being able to proceed without violating either a court or an SEC mandate.56 It was apparent, concluded the Court, that Congress intended
to allow the SEC to supervise the fixing of reasonable rates of commission, and therefore, making the Exchange Act work as intended required
implying antitrust immunity in this context.57
While joining the majority opinion, Justice Douglas authored a
separate concurring opinion in which he stressed the single most
important factor in the Court's analysis-actual review by a competent
regulatory agency.5 8 Justice Douglas argued that the antitrust laws
safeguard a strong public interest in free and open competition, and
immunity from those laws should only be implied when some other
equivalent mechanism is functioning to protect that interest. 59
United States v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc."° was the
last of the three precedent cases to consider the interplay between the
securities and antitrust regulatory regimes and was decided the same
day as Gordon. The Court considered an antitrust action by the United

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 682.
(quoting United States v. Phila. Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963)).
at 683 (quoting Silver, 373 U.S. at 357).
at 685.

Id. at 689.
Id. at 691.
Id. (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 692.
422 U.S. 694 (1975).
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States Department of Justice against the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD"), certain mutual funds, and certain
broker-dealers. 6 ' The complaint alleged that the defendants agreed (1)
to fix resale prices of mutual fund shares; (2) to limit the free distribution of shares by limiting when, how, to whom, and from whom brokerdealers could buy and sell mutual fund shares; and (3) to restrict brokerdealers from selling and buying shares from each other.12 The Department of Justice, joined by a host of private plaintiffs, argued that these
agreements constituted horizontal and vertical combinations and
conspiracies that restricted trade of mutual fund shares in secondary
market transactions in violation of the Sherman Act.0
Like in Gordon the SEC was legislatively empowered to regulate the
Specifically, the Investment Company Act of 1940
conduct at issue.'
("ICA")65 vested in the SEC broad regulatory authority over the
business practices of mutual fund companies.66 The ICA required that
broker-dealers maintain a uniform price with respect to sales in the
primary market, where issuing companies trade shares with investors
directly or through broker-dealers.67 The ICA also authorized mutual
funds to impose restrictions on the negotiability and transferability of
their shares, provided these restrictions did not contravene any SEC
These provisions of the ICA were intended to remedy the
rule.'
problem of a bootleg secondary market in mutual fund shares, which,
during the enactment of the statute, had been identified by Congress as
detrimental to mutual fund investors.69
Examining the legislative history of the ICA, the Court held that the
restrictions on the transferability of shares (the alleged vertical
restraints) were, subject to SEC disapproval, among the restrictions
contemplated by Congress when it enacted the ICA. ° Therefore, these
restrictions were immune from antitrust liability because there was no
way to reconcile the SEC's power to authorize the restrictions and the
competing mandate of the antitrust laws.7 Citing Silver the Court
explained that if the regulatory scheme established by the ICA was to

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 700.
Id. at 701-03.
Id. at 701-02.
Id. at 704-05.
15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
NASD, 422 U.S. at 704-05.
Id. at 699.
Id. at 720-21.
Id. at 709.
Id. at 721-22.
Id.
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work properly, the antitrust laws had to yield.72 As to the alleged
horizontal conspiracy pertaining to the defendants' attempts to prevent
the growth of a secondary mutual fund market, the Court held that the
SEC's substantial regulatory authority in the area of mutual fund
activities was sufficiently pervasive to confer implied antitrust immunity
on the defendants.7 3 In closing, the Court held that allowing an
antitrust action to proceed against activities so directly related to the
SEC's responsibilities posed a substantial risk of subjecting the
defendants to duplicative and inconsistent standards.74
NASD, unlike Gordon, was decided over the vigorous dissent of four
Justices. 75 The dissent complained that the majority's holding would
imply immunity in all cases where a regulatory agency has the authority
to approve business conduct. 76 This immunity could occur regardless
of whether the agency is required to weigh antitrust considerations or
whether Congress intended to replace judicial oversight with administraThe dissent distinguished
tive oversight of the antitrust laws.77
Gordon, which was decided the very same day as NASD, and argued
that in Gordon, Congress provided an administrative substitute for
antitrust enforcement by vesting in the SEC the power to fix commission
rates and calling on the agency to take competitive factors into account
in approving or disapproving proposed rates.78
IV.

COURT'S RATIONALE

A. Implying Antitrust Immunity
The Court in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing 9 began
its analysis by noting that in some circumstances, regulatory statutes
explicitly state whether and to what extent they preclude application of
However, where regulatory statutes do not
the antitrust laws.'
mention antitrust, courts must determine whether and in what respect
the statutes implicitly preclude the antitrust laws.8 '

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 729-30 (citing Silver, 373 U.S. 341 (1963)).
Id. at 730.
Id. at 735.
Id. 735-48 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 736.
Id.
Id. at 741.
127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007).
Id. at 2389.
Id.
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B. The Securities Precedents
The Court next turned to its three precedent cases that specifically
addressed the relation of securities law to antitrust law. Analyzing
Silver v. NYSE, 2 the majority reiterated that courts, where possible,
should attempt to reconcile the operation of both conflicting schemes
instead of holding one completely ousted.' The majority also repeated
with approval Silver's guiding principle in the reconciliation of the two
schemes that "'[riepeal of the antitrust laws is to be regarded as implied
only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even
then only to the minimum extent necessary.'" ' 4
The Court turned next to Gordon v. NYSE 85 and highlighted that
opinion's emphasis on three sets of considerations: (1) the existence of
direct SEC regulatory power over the subject matter involved; (2) the
SEC's active role in regulating the area; and (3) the conflicting standards
that exchanges would be subjected to without immunity from the
antitrust laws. 8 According to the Court, the majority in United States
v. NASD 87 also relied on the three Gordon factors in reaching its
decision that the securities laws implicitly precluded antitrust laws.88
Fashioning its inquiry from its prior decisions, the Court in Credit
Suisse announced that when deciding whether securities laws preclude
antitrust laws, a court is deciding whether the two are "clearly
incompatible" based on the context and likely consequences. 89 Looking
to Gordon and NASD for guidance, the Court announced that four
factors would be treated as critical: (1) the existence of regulatory
authority to supervise the questioned activities; (2) evidence that the
responsible agency exercises the authority; (3) the risk of conflicting
guidance, requirements, duties, privileges, or standards of conduct if
both sets of laws apply; and (4) whether the conflict lies squarely within
an area of financial market activity that the securities laws seek to
regulate.90

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

373 U.S. 341 (1963).
Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2389-90 (quoting Silver, 373 U.S. at 357).
Id. at 2390 (brackets in original) (quoting Silver, 373 U.S. at 357).
422 U.S. 659 (1975).
Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2390 (quoting Gordon, 422 U.S. at 685, 689).
422 U.S. 694 (1975).
Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2391.
Id. at 2392 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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C. Analysis of the Factors
The Court began its analysis of the four factors it identified as crucial
by noting that in this case, three of the factors were clearly met."' For
one, the Court determined that underwriters' efforts to sell newly issued
securities lay at the heart of the securities marketing enterprise.92
Additionally, the Court concluded that the Exchange Act93 clearly
granted the SEC authority to supervise all of the questioned activity.9 4
Finally, according to the Court, the SEC had continuously exercised its
legal authority to regulate the conduct at issue.95 Therefore, the Court
held, the only factor left to analyze was whether there was a conflict
between the securities law and the antitrust laws and, if so, whether the
conflict arose to the level of incompatibility.96
The Court read the complaints as attacking underwriters' joint efforts
to collect commissions through the practices alleged (laddering and tying
agreements, for example), as opposed to attacking the formation of
syndicates and the fixing of their commissions generally.9"
The
plaintiffs argued there was no conflict because the SEC already
disapproved of the conduct in question and would not likely approve it
in the foreseeable future. 98
Even assuming arguendo these pro-plaintiff premises, the Court held
that the securities and antitrust laws were clearly incompatible. 9 To
permit the antitrust actions, the Court argued, would threaten serious
securities-related harm because "only a fine, complex, detailed line"
separates activity the SEC permits from activity the SEC forbids. °0
It would be difficult, the Court stated, for someone who is not familiar
with accepted syndicate practices to separate accepted behavior from
forbidden behavior. 10 1 With respect to laddering, for example, the SEC
permits underwriters to inquire into customers' desired future positions
in the long term.'0 2 However, the SEC forbids an underwriter from

91. Id. at 2393.
92. Id. at 2392.
93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
94. Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2392.
95. Id. at 2393.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2393-94.
98. Id. at 2394.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. (quoting Comm'n Guidance Regarding Prohibited Conduct in Connection with
IPO Allocations, Release Nos. 33-8565; 34-51500; IC-26828; File No. S7-03-05, 70 Fed. Reg.
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asking customers whether, at what price, and in what quantity they
intend to place immediate aftermarket orders for shares.'
In cases
like this, evidence tending to show an unlawful antitrust activity and
evidence that shows a lawful securities marketing activity might overlap
or be identical. 10 4 Only the SEC, the Court
concluded, is able to make
10 5
such fine distinctions with confidence.
The Court further reasoned that plaintiffs may bring antitrust
lawsuits throughout the country in courts with nonexpert judges and
juries.'
Given the fact-sensitive nature of the considerations, there
would be an unusually high risk that courts would evaluate similar
factual circumstances differently if they were allowed to hear these types
of cases.'0 7 The Court reiterated the SEC's concerns, voiced in the
district court, that failing to imply immunity in this situation would
threaten to disrupt the SEC's ability to regulate the marketing of
securities and would have a chilling effect on tremendously important,
lawful syndication activities.' °
D.

The Need for Lawsuits to Enforce Antitrust Laws

In Silver there was no other way to police the strong antitrust policy
protecting competition other than through private suits under antitrust
laws; in Credit Suisse, the Court held that no such need was present.'0 9 The Court noted that, in this case, the SEC actively enforced
the rules and regulations that prohibited the challenged conduct."0
Moreover, the SEC is instructed to consider competition, among other
things, when deciding which rules and regulations to promulgate.'
Further, the Court noted that, as an alternative, harmed investors could
bring lawsuits under the securities laws and obtain damages. 1 2
Having concluded that all four factors derived from Gordon and NASD
were clearly met, the Court held that the securities laws were "clearly

at 19, 672, 19, 676 (Apr. 7, 2005)).
103. Id. (quoting Comm'n Guidance Regarding Prohibited Conduct in Connection with
IPO Allocations, 70 Fed. Reg. at 19, 675).
104. Id. at 2395.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2396.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. It should be noted, however, that plaintiffs suing under the securities laws
would not be able to recover treble damages, as they would under an antitrust theory of
recovery. See id.
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incompatible" with the application of the antitrust
laws in the context
113
of the marketing of securities by underwriters.
E.

Justice Stevens's Concurrence
Justice Stevens, concurring in the Court's judgment, argued that there
was no need to imply antitrust immunity because the defendants' alleged
conduct did not violate the antitrust laws."' According to Justice
Stevens, to suggest that underwriters could restrain trade in the
incredibly vast market of publicly traded securities by manipulating the
terms of certain public offerings was frivolous. 1 5 Justice Stevens also
took issue with the Court's reliance on the risk that antitrust courts
were unusually prone to making serious mistakes." 6

F

Justice Thomas's Dissent

Justice Thomas, in true originalist fashion, argued in his dissenting
opinion that the savings clauses found in both the Securities Act of
1933" ' and the Exchange Act preserved the rights and remedies
existing outside the securities laws." 8 Those provisions state that the
rights and remedies provided by the respective securities laws "'shall be
in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist in
law or in equity.""' 9 Surely, Justice Thomas argued, the Sherman
Act, 120 enacted in 1890, would have been thought of as a right and
remedy that existed in law or in equity by the Congresses that enacted
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act in the early 1930s. 2 ' For
Justice Thomas, there was no convincing argument for why these
savings clauses
should not resolve the case in favor of the plaintiff122
respondents.
V.

IMPLICATIONS

The Court's decision in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v.
Billing12 will have a number of different, far-reaching effects. By

113.

Id. at 2397 (internal quotation marks omitted).

114.

Id. at 2398 (Stevens, J., concurring).

115.

Id.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000 & Supp V 2005).
Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2399 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77p(a) (2000)).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2399 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id.
127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007).
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holding in favor of the defendants, the Court has immunized investment
banks from any form of antitrust liability in connection with the
marketing of securities. This is particularly important because antitrust
claims pose the threat of awards of treble damages as well as attorney
fees. This immunization from antitrust attack effectively takes the
important task of protecting competition in the securities markets away
from private plaintiffs and entrusts it solely to the SEC. As a practical
matter, this makes sense because securities law issues can be exceedingly complex and, in certain cases, competition must yield to other
interests, such as the continued effective administration of the nation's
capital markets. Normal, everyday people and judges generally do not
have the comprehensive knowledge of the intricate securities laws that
is needed to balance the twin public policy goals of promoting competition and protecting the securities industry. After Credit Suisse, the
responsibility for making these difficult decisions has been effectively
transferred from the judicial to the executive branch.
While the Court's distrust of juries and lower court judges is questionable, particularly because these less distinguished individuals are
regularly called upon to make similarly difficult policy decisions, one
result of Credit Suisse that is beyond dispute is that the investment
banking industry has scored a major coup by insulating itself from any
sort of antitrust liability. The decision in Credit Suisse coats with a
patina of acceptability the investment banks' overreaching behavior
during the technology bubble of the late 1990s. While the banks might
well eventually have to answer for their behavior in actions under the
securities laws-which the majority opinion intimates is the correct
avenue for recovery in this case-the banks need not fear the rod of
treble damages and attorney fees. In addition, the banks will save the
tremendous expense required to respond to sweeping antitrust discovery
requests.
While the Court's decision in Credit Suisse implicates both securities
and antitrust law, the case primarily serves as another star in the
Court's recent constellation of cases limiting the reach of antitrust laws.
124
During its 2006-2007 term, the Court decided four antitrust cases.
While each case revolved around different factual scenarios, they all
shared one unifying theme: limiting potential plaintiffs' recourse under
the antitrust laws.'25 In all four cases, the Court overturned circuit

124. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007); Credit
Suisse, 127 S. Ct. 2383; Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007); Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007).
125. Marcia Coyle, Tough Term for Antitrust Plaintiffs: Decisions Limit Access to
Recourse Under the Antitrust Laws, 189 N.J. L.J. 267, 267 (2007).
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court decisions that favored the plaintiffs. 126 While lawyers on the
plaintiff's bar complain that this shows the Court's lapdogish pandering
to large business interests and conservative politics, this is not exactly
true. 127 A better explanation is that the Court is trying to streamline
the vastly expensive system of antitrust litigation, allowing competitive
issues to be solved in the marketplace rather than the courtroom and
12
weeding out nonmeritorious claims at the pleading stage.
JOHN

126.
127.
128.

Id.
See id.
Id.
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